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William van Caenegem, Associate Professor of Law, Bond
University, Queensland
The "public domain" in intellectual property law is said
to consist of intangible goods that are not subject to
exclusive intellectual property rights and which are
freely available to be used or exploited by any person.
Maintaining a "healthy" public domain by limiting
rights of appropriation in intangible goods is commonly
put forward as an important public policy goal.
In this article, the author questions the conceptual
value and impact of the concept of the "public
domain". The article starts from the basic proposition
that the subject-matter of intellectual property law is
knowledge in its various forms. It is suggested that the
essence of intellectual property law is not to determine
which knowledge is available for appropriation, but to
identify which knowledge cannot be appropriated. From
this perspective, the notion of the "public domain" in
fact operates to deny claims to control certain forms of
human knowledge.
Some such claims over "public domain knowledge"
are arguably legitimate within a normative framework
that differs from the dominant norm in a given society.
Social groups that have different normative structures
regarding control over knowledge can find that use of
the concept "public domain", which forms part of the
dominant norm, trumps their claims.
For instance, from the perspective of certain indige-
nous Australian peoples, the notion of "public domain"
operates to deny the effect of their own legitimate
norms concerning control of both artistic and techno-
logical knowledge. Public domain knowledge can thus
be referred to as scientia nullius, in the same manner that
land, until Mabo,1 was considered to have been terra
nullius in Australia prior to European occupation.
The article concludes that the traditional notion of
the "public domain" is one of uncertain utility that is
only positive viewed from a singular cultural and social
perspective. At the very least, its legitimate purpose and
The author wishes to thank his colleague Dr Janet McDonald for her
invaluable remarks and suggestions concerning an earlier draf~ of this
article.
1 Mabo v. Queensland[No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. This deci-
sion of the High Court abandoned the notition of terra nullius in
relation to Australian land prior to European occupation and
recognised common law "native title" rights to land.
effect in intellectual property theory is relative and
insufficiently understood.
The Traditional Notion of the PuNic Domain
The public domain is traditionally defined in the neg-
ative, as consisting of those "intangible goods" not sub-
ject to intellectual property rights.2 From this
perspective the public domain contains:
¯ intellectual property for which the term of protection
has run out;
® intellectual property that has been forfeited or is
unclaimed; and
® those intangible goods that fall outside the scope of
protection of intellectual property laws.
The essence of this approach is that nobody can restrict
the use of public domain knowledge by relying on the
rules of intellectual property law.3
Positive and Negative Theories of the Public
Domain
Recently the theory of the public domain has come to
the fore in the debate over the expansion of the scope of
intellectual property rights (or so-called "commodifica-
tion of knowledge"). Expansion of intellectual property
rights is said to threaten a healthy public domain. On
this view, the public domain is a bastion against privati-
sation of knowledge. It serves the public interest by
enabling free access to artistic expression, education
and scientific research, thus enhancing creativity, self-
expression and a productive cultural and artistic life.4
Some authors have recently recognised the inherent
limitations of the negative theory of the publiE domain.
They advocate the need to postulate a positive theory, i.e.
a theory that actively defines the characteristics of what
is or should be in the public domain.5 Such a theory
2 Corresponding notions are "intellectual commons", or
"public sphere". The "public domain" notion is equally relevant
to the arts and copyright-related industries, as to scientific pur-
suits and patent-related industries.
3 However, it may be possible to control intangibles by other
means, for instance in the context of the development of the
internet as a legal sphere in which intangible goods are con-
trolled by way of contractual rather than statutory prohibitions.
Apart from contract, other regulatory systems may affect access
to the "public domain", e.g. trade practices law or corporations
law. Non-legal factors also affect the openness of the public
domain (e.g. market dominance).
4 In the contexts of scientific research, see R. P. Merges,
"Property rights theory and the commons: the case of scientific
research" (1996) 13 Soc.Phil. & Policy 145-167. In relation to
the whole of intellectual property law, see K. Aoki, "Authors,
inventors and trademark owners: Private intellectual property
and the public domain" (1993-4) 18/1 Columbia-VIM Journal of
Law and the Arts 1; and Part II in 18/3-4. In the context of
musical copyright, see J. Heald, "Reviving the rhetoric of the
public interest: choir directors, copy machines and new arrange-
ments of public domain music" (1996) 46 Duke L.J. 241. Much
of the debate concerns the effect of rent-seeking behaviour of
firms on the balance between private interest and the public
interest.
5 One might call it a taxonomy of public domain knowledge.
See, e.g.J. Litman, "The Public Domain" (1990) 39 Emory L.J.
965; D. Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain" (1981) 44
Law & Contemporary Problems 147.
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would then permit of a more effective defence against
commodification.
But is the notion in fact so inherently vague and
uncertain that it has very limited use as an analytical
tool, whatever the theoretical context?6
The Scope of IPRs and the Public Domain
Determining the ideal size of a "healthy" public
domain, and by inference, the scope of intellectual
property rights, is a conceptually, analytically and
empirically challenging task.
Take for instance the contention that as the scope of
intellectual property rights expands, the public domain
automatically contracts. This is not really as clear-cut as
it at first appears. If the incentive effect of intellectual
property rights is given any credence at all,7 then argu-
ably the greater the incentive--that is to say, the greater
the potential returns from the production of new know-
ledge because of the greater scope for appropriation of
those returns--the greater the volume of intangible
goods created,s And the more intangible goods are cre-
ated, the greater, both immediately and eventually, the
extent of the public domain!
Immediately, because the creation of most intellec-
tual property has a spillover effect into the public
domain. For example, the ideas in a copyright work are
immediately available for development by others; the
patent specification is an open source of information
concerning technology. Eventually, because when the
term of the IPRs runs out, intangible goods are avail-
able for all to use.9 At the very least, therefore, there is
no simple linear relationship between the scope of IPRs
and the size of the public domain.
What use the PuNic Domain?
The nature of the relationship between the scope of
IPRs and the size of the public domain is unclear.
Moreover, there is neither a comprehensive taxonomy
nor clear understanding of the value of public domain
knowledge. Theoretically the value of its contents lies in
its free availability for research, education, imitation
an4 ~reative adaptation. But it is apparent that the value
of such knowledge must be, at the very least, very vari-
able. Just a couple of points will illustrate this.
6 See, e.g., E. Samuels, "The public domain in copyright law"
(1993) J.Copr.Soc’y 41 at 137.
7 i.e. the reward of exploitable property rights increases the
production of intellectual goods from the suboptimal level that
exists in the absence of such rights.
8 Although the race for windfall profits may in fact result in
duplication of investment if the rewards are potentially too great,
e.g. if the scope of the patent to be granted is very wide.
9 Granted that in specific cases it can be convincingly argued
that the granting of property rights on the basis of rent-seeking
activity of existing IPR owners is detrimental to the public inter-
est. But this does not support a general argument that the
creation of additional IPRs is automatically detrimental to the
public domain as, for instance, is the case with extension of term
of existing rights, which favours investment in existing I.P. to the
detriment of investment in future I.P. It is an entirely different
argument that too broad IPRs lend themselves to detrimental
monopolistic conduct through cumulation, accumulation of
market power and the like.
First, an unknown proportion of practical knowledge
may, by the time it enters the public domain, be of little
practical utility, because of the rapid pace of scientific
discovery, innovation and technological change in an
industrial society.I° Nonetheless, some knowledge that
enters the public domain may be useful to competitors
seeking access to markets even after a relatively long
term of protection has expired. For instance, some pat-
ented pharmaceutical inventions still have profit poten-
tial as generic drugs at the expiry of the patent
term. 11
Secondly, much public domain knowledge is of no
immediate utility. Two reasons for this stand out: it is
commonly interwoven with proprietary knowledge; and
it requires people with relevant tacit knowledge and
experience to turn it to account.
Accordingly, there seems to be little conceptual
advantage in general and undifferentiated assertions
concerning the threat to the public domain whenever
some extensions of IPRs is proposed. There is no gen-
erally accepted established basis for presuming that
reducing the size of the public domain (if that were the
result of increased IPRs) per se is against the public
interest in access to useful kanowledge. This is not to say
that assessing the effect of specific rules of intellectual
property law on access to certain kinds of knowledge is
not a significant task.12
The undifferentiated concept of the public domain is
thus vague and difficult to apply in other than the most
abstract terms. Should one therefore simply ignore it as
irrelevant, as unable to sway opinion one way or the
other in the debate concerning the optimal scope of
intellectual property rights? Maybe so, if it were not for
the fact that its impact is not necessarily neutral. This
article will illustrate below how the public domain con-
cept, as an integral part of dominant normative struc-
tures, may inadvertently justify the denial of the
otherwise legitimate claims of indigenous peoples to
control intangibles. But this analysis does not apply to
claims by indigenous peoples alone. Other groups
whose normative structures are subordinated by the
dominant norm can be affected in a similar manner.
10 Take the example of copyright: works generally enter the
public domain 50 years after the death of the author. In indus-
trialised nations the average age at death of a woman is approx-
imately 75. If a person’s most productive years are between the
ages of 25 (when they finish their education) and 65 (when they
retire) this means that a work may enter the public domain
between 60 and 100 years after it was made. Will there be much
interest in it, or use for it? What if the work is a computer
program? In truth much knowledge may be of little application
in a competitive market, even long before the expiry of the term
of protection.
11 Hence the attempts of rent-seekers to extend the term; in
the United States individual patent owners have been successful
in obtaining extensions of term for specific compounds. The
extension of pharmaceutical patent terms on the basis of loss of
monopoly term because of marketing approval requirements can
also be seen as the result of successful rent-seeking lobbying by
pharmaceutical patentees. In many other areas, patented inven-
tions are of historical interest only after 20 years, and there is
little interest in them either from competitors or the patentee.
12 Furthermore, an argument that the public domain notion
as such is of little utility does nto amount to an assertion that
creation is not vitally dependent on imitation and re-use of exist-
ing knowledge.
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The subject=matter of Intellectual Property
Law
But before we arrive at that conclusion, we must first go
back to basics and re-conceptualise the subject-matter
of intellectual property law in positive terms and with-
out immediate reference to the divide between "propri-
etary rights" and "the public domain". Then we must
examine how some lcnowledge came to be the subject of
proprietary rights, and other knowledge not. That
examination will reveal how this divide came about
through a culturally determined process, an insight that
will take us back to considering the impact of the public
domain on indigenous claims to control lranowledge.
This exercise of determining what is the subject-
matter of intellectual property law is not co-extensive
with the question: "What are the rights comprehended
in intellectual property law?" Nor can it be answered
usefully by saying that "intellectual property law is con-
cerned with property in intangibles". The subject-mat-
ter must be defined without reference to highly abstract
concepts such as "intangibles" or legal notions such as
"property". The use of these terms in this field of law is
nothing if not confusing. 13 What should be emphasised
here is that intellectual property law is not only con-
cerned with material subject to legal rights; certain
things that fall outside the protection of the law are just
as much its proper subject-matter as what falls within
the boundaries of defined rights. That raises the ques-
tion of how to draw the limits of the subject-matter.14
The subject-matter of real property and personal
property law is physical things or the physical environ-
ment. In intellectual property law physical things only
have importance as follows. First, in terms of the sub-
sistence and delineation of IPRs: for instance, copy-
right works must be in some material form. And
secondly, in terms of allocating ownership of those
rights: for instance, the author of a copyright work is
the person who first reduced it to material form. Fur-
thermore, physical form may serve to represent or
communicate the subject-matter of intellectual prop-
erty law, but it cannot be said to be the subject-matter
of intellectual property law. If this is so, then what is?1~
13 Nor does the author want to have recourse to notions such
as "intangible" or "incorporeal" goods. That only replaces one
abstract concept with another.
14 In answering this question we must now accept that non-
patrimonial rights (so-called moral rights) are also a legitimate
part of intellectual property law, even in English speaking coun-
tries, and that trade mark law, although in many respects differ-
ent from other areas of intellectual property law, is nonetheless
considered part of it.
15 Much scholarship about the subject-matter of intellectual
property law is concerned with applying the legal concept of
property to "intangibles"; the focus is then usually on the mean-
ing of "property", and how property in intangibles may be justi-
fied. This then often goes back to the two great schools of
thought, the "Lockean" just deserts theory and a more con-
tinental European perception of inherent rights in the emanation
of the personality of the creator; see, e.g., R Drahos, A philosophy
of intellectual property (1996). Much historical analysis also
focuses on the property aspects; see, e.g., B. Sherman and L.
Bently, The making of intellectual property law (1999). Future
gazing in this area of law also focuses on the property issues; see,
e.g.B. Shulman, Owning the future (1999). Much of the eco-
nomic literature also focuses on property. In the process, the
question "property in what?", seems often lost from view.
The author posits simply that it is human knowl-
edge.16
The simple notion that human knowledge is the sub-
ject-matter of intellectual property law may be illus-
trated by reference to the various regimes. Copyright
law consists of rights in what are ultimately expressions
of either practical or artistic human knowledge. For
instance, a painting represents human knowledge con-
cerning the visual world, artistic techniques, creative
ideas, etc. An architectural drawing is an expression of
technical knowledge combined with artistic experience
and creativity, etc. Patent law consists of rights in prac-
tical human kaaowledge. Design law is concerned with
human knowledge and experience about the appear-
ance of industrial goods, etc. Intellectual property law is
ultimately concerned with the results of a process of
human thought, as opposed to simply a process of
human action. 17
Rights to Knowledge: the Dominant Norm
Having adopted "human knowledge" as the subject-
matter of intellectual property law, our next step is to
examine how certain knowledge came to be carved out
of that amorphous and indeterminate field. Over a
period of centuries, European jurisdictions (and their
successors) formulated and applied legal rules to the
subject-matter of "human knowledge", delineating
exclusive rights of varying scope and effect. These legal
rules have now become the dominant global norm.
This process of excising the areas of human know-
ledge and experience that became subject to IPRs from
the broader subject-matter was and continues to be
bounded culturally and socio-economically. The pro-
cess reflects the cultural and economic imperatives of
specific "Western" polities with a relatively homoge-
nous political, cultural and socio-economic infrastruc-
ture. 18
What were the most crucial socio-economic imper-
atives? First, the integration of certain aspects of
human l~owledge into markets19; secondly, a search
for legal norms reflecting the perceived relationship
16 Thus the subject-matter of intellectual property law is more
than only the knowledge and experience that can be protected by
IPRs at any given time. Knowledge is initially in the mind,
although it may then be shared, be codified, become part of a
"body of knowledge", or of "culture", "art", "tradition", etc.
There is a danger of excessive reductionism in proposing this
definition. However, as will become apparent below, the essen-
tial reason for using this defmition is to emphasise that the sub-
ject-matter of I.R is broader than those things in which we
recognise legal rights. How to define that subject-matter most
accurately and comprehensively is open to much debate. In the
author’s opinion this conceptualisation is well supported when it
comes to the legal protection of goodwill as well, although there
are arguments in favour of treating goodwill differently.
17 Although human action is relevant in terms of delineating
the rights over human knowledge (e.g. by acts of expression, or
making).
18 In modern intellectual property law the author includes
what Sherman and Bently, n. 15 above, refer to as pre-modern
intellectual property law.
19 The big shift that occurred was that the value, in terms of
trade, of emanations of the mind became apparent; this required
the structuring of rights in manifestations of knowledge, experi-
ence, etc., and the balancing of various public policy concerns in
the process.
[2002] E.I.ER. ISSUE 6 © SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]
VAN CAENEGEM: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: SCIENTIA NULLIUS?: [2002] E.I.P.R. 327
between the creator and the external object of her
creation2°; and thirdly, the association between the
expression and application of human knowledge, and
human advancement and social progress. These fac-
tors influenced the formulation of legal rules in the
context of specific political processes, as this article
attempts to illustrate below.
In the light of these cultural and economic factors,
the core characteristics of IPRs are unsurprising. The
grant of IPRs depends on some external manifestation
of human knowledge and experience (reification);
they are precisely delineated, usually by reference to
the material form in which they are expressed; only
new or original expressions of knowledge are the sub-
ject of rights; the expression of knowledge usually
originates with an identifiable person; and the rights
are limited in extent and in time.21 These are the core
concepts of subsistence of rights in intellectual prop-
erty law.
In terms of the law, since the eighteenth century the
predominant focus of intellectual property doctrine has
been on the applicability of the legal concept of prop-
erty to "intangibles".22 This was an issue at the time of
the literary copyright debates in England. Unsurpris-
ingly, it is still alive today.23 "Property rights", at least to
some degree, allowed knowledge to become a recogni-
sable object of economic exchange, or alternatively
granted an author a legal basis to exercise her moral
control over expressions of knowledge. The boundaries
of intellectual property rights were fixed in the context
of a debate about property rights. But if one looks
beyond its constituent legal concepts, it is evident that
the characteristic features of intellectual property law
are rooted in the cultural, economic and technological
conditions of Western Europe since the late middle
ages. A brief illustration of that point, focusing on pat-
ents and copyright law, follows.
Determining the boundaries ol intellectual
property rights: patents and copyright
External manifestation and precise delineation
With the invention of the printing press the processes
of authorship and of distribution could easily be
20 The latter view has been more prevalent in continental
Europe and is best illustrated by reference to moral rights think-
ing in copyright law; the former view is more of the essence of
I.R law in English-spealrdng industrialised economies.
21 Although trade marks are indeterminate in their duration,
they are not unlimited in time. Cessation of use of a registered
trade mark will ultimately result in the demise of the registered
right.
22 For an interesting historical overview, with reference to rel-
evant primary and secondary materials, see Sherman and Ben-
tly, n. 15 above; see also C. Seville, Literary Copyright in early
Victorian England (1999). For a contemporary analysis of the
relationship between the legal concept of property and
intangibles, see Drahos, n. 15 above.
23 Adopting the language of property was useful shorthand,
but there is no doubt that the analogy with property in land or
chattels is a difficult one. Much of the modern debate about
property is framed in terms of economic analysis.
separated.24 Knowledge could be "codified’’~5 and pre-
sented in a consistent, determinate and predictable for-
mat which was adapted to printing and distribution.
Importantly, in the standardised format of the printed
book, the link between author and work could be clearly
and consistently maintained. In other words, the author
remained identifiable despite the multiple reproduc-
tions and distribution of the work. The work did not
become distorted in the process of reproduction and
distribution in the way that spoken words change a story
in the telling.
At the same time, it became possible to distribute this
codified lmowledge at a relatively modest cost to all
those who could read.26 At a time of political and relig-
ious change and nascent scientific inquiry27 there was a
demand for new knowledge. However, the relevant
technology required investment in machinery and in
learning. There was a risk inherent in publishing new
works, and unsurprisingly printers sought and gained
exclusive legal rights that reduced that risk and
enhanced profitability.
The predictability and consistency of the format of
printed works (books) made them a logical focus for the
identification of rights.~ Because of the slowness of the
cycle of radical technological change, rights could be
centred effectively around a broadly defined technol-
ogy.29 Furthermore, because the function of authorship
and of distribution became separated, there needed to
be a way to structure the relationship between author
and publisher. In a society where legal rules and the
notion of property formed the basis of individual
exchange and agreement, mutual legal rights and obli-
gations and property were the logical format.
In terms of patents, opposition to monopolies meant
that the rights in "any new manner of manufacture"
had to be limited in scope.3° The focus of the early
patent system was on enhancing the technological and
skills base of the nation in a burgeoning rural and met-
ropolitan manufacturing industry: hence the granting of
monopolies in practical inventions, rather than in dis-
coveries or in organisation innovations. The invention
had to be delineated and practical. Furthermore,
because of the preceding history of indiscriminate grant
of trading monopolies, any monopoly of indeterminate
scope or extent was viewed with such suspicion as to be
24 This rift between the creation and distribution or presenta-
tion of knowledge and experience was of fundamental impor-
tance; previously creativity and performance were more
intimately linked. There was a close relationship between the
creator and her audience, which largely disappeared thereafter.
One of the "promises" of the internet is the re-establishment of
this closer bond.
25 The author uses the term "codified knowledge" as know-
ledge recorded in some form, as opposed to "tacit" knowledge,
which is in the mind of a person.
26 And many literate people happened also to be those who
could afford to master the skill of reading and writing.
27 As to the emergence and evolution of Enlightenment
rationalism, see R. Porter, The Enlightenment (2nd ed., 2001).
28 Copyright has since then adapted to attach rights to new
formats of expression (or technologies) that become current and
sufficiently stable and established.
29 The same can be said for designs at a later stage.
30 Any new manner of manufactures was the terminology used
in the Statute of Monopolies, and still used in the Patents Act
1990 (Cth) to circumscribe patentable subject-matter.
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a political impossibility.31 Clear delineation required
precise description, which also assisted the ultimate
goal of the system of patent grant: wide diffusion of the
most productive technologies and associated skills.
Originality or novelty, and an identifiable creator
In copyright law, the requirement of originality arose in
the context of the transition from the grant of printing
monopolies (of the Stationers’ Guild) to the statutory
grant of a "monopoly" over works of authorship, lim-
ited in time.32 Since printing (or publishing) monopo-
lies were out of the question, the ingenious trick of the
printing trade was to argue in favour of authors’ rights.
Originality was the legal link between author and work.
Printers knew full well that they could easily and
cheaply acquire the authors’ rights, to give themselves
the effective monopoly they desired. The price they
paid was a limitation on the duration of exclusive rights.
The limited duration of the rights naturally set in train
a search for new works to replace the old, because with-
out new works there was no monopoly. The search for
new or original works became an economic imperative
for publishers (or printers).
Thus the rift between authorship and distribution
naturally shifted the focus to authorship and the inextri-
cably linked requirement of novelty or originality. The
rise of a more romantic notion of authorship, always
tempered by respect for tradition and imitation, only
added to this emphasis on originality and individuality
in later times.33
Patents were primarily granted with three goals in
mind: the introduction of manufacturing technology,
either newly invented or newly obtained from abroad34;
the training of workers within the jurisdiction in the use
of the technology35; and the eventual wide diffusion of
productive technologies. These aims require close
attention to the novelty of the invention. There is no
point in granting a monopoly to a manufacture that is
already established. In any case, such a monopoly
would be equivalent to the practice of granting
monopolies over existing trades and industries, which
the Statute of Monopolies was intended to abolish.
Establishing novelty required proof that others had not
31 It may be so that the term monopoly is not really applicable
to new inventions, since there can hardly be an objection to
granting a monopoly in something that by definition does not
exist at the time the promise of a monopoly rent is held out. In
the same way, we do not speak in terms of a monopoly if a man
cuts down a tree and chops it into blocks for firewood: he may
have property in the blocks, but we do not say he has a monopoly
in them.
32 By authorship is meant the need for an identifiable
author.
33 See Sherman and Bently, n. 15 above; see also D. Saunders,
Authorship and Copyright (1992); and Woodmansee and Jaszi,
eds., The Construction of-duthorship~ Textual appropriation in law
and literature (1994). See also Seville, n. 22 above, concerning
the framing of the 1842 Copyright Act (U.K.).
34 The distinct search for inventiveness, i.e. for a small leap of
individual "genius", as a separate requirement is relatively new,
since inventiveness only became a separate requirement for
validity in the 20th century.
35 Extending the technical skills of the population supported
the continuity of manufacture once the patent term ended.
made the invention before, in other words, that this
particular claimant was the first to make the invention.
The grant of patents thus naturally becomes centred
around the person of the inventor, who must be identi-
fied to enable the process of comparison between the
old and the (allegedly) new.
Temporal limitation
Patent monopolies could only be for a limited term
since there was a clear purpose to them which made
them politically acceptable: to improve the technolog-
ical basis of industry. The price that had to be paid for
the introduction and diffusion of a technology within
the jurisdiction, and for the education of the workforce,
was a temporary monopoly. Exclusive rights of inde-
terminate duration were politically unacceptable and
ultimately would not serve the goal of extending the
manufacturing base of the economy (i.e. diffusion of
technology).
With the passing of the Statute of Anne in 1709,
publishers rescued a copyright of limited duration from
the abolition of the indeterminate printers’ monopoly.
The monopoly of the Stationers’ Guild had become
inextricably linked with crown censorship and restric-
tions on the freedom of expression and of religion.
Retention of an unlimited copyright carried with it the
risk of reimposition of such restrictions, since there
would be a determinate and readily controllable rather
than--at the expiry of the copyright term--an inde-
terminate number of potential publishers. Freedom of
expression, of scientific inquiry and of religion as
emerging tenets of a liberal and democratic polity were
and remain fundamentally incompatible with monopo-
lies over forms of expression that are unlimited in
term.
The Public Domain as Public Dispossession:
Scientia Nullius
Modern intellectual property law thus sanctions control
over knowledge if certain socially, economically and
culturally determined conditions, translated into legal
norms, are met. Thus a claim to legal control over
knowledge will normally fail where there is no external
manifestation or precise delineation, no identifiable
author or inventor,36 no novelty or originality, and the
claim recognises no temporal limitation.37 In other
words, that knowledge to which such a claim extends
will be said to be in the public domain, available for all
to use, or for transformative appropriation.
From this perspective, the notion of the public
domain supports the rejection of claims to control
human knowledge. Some such claims are clearly with-
out any justification; however, in other cases such
36 Le. the author or inventor is either unidentifiable, does not
want or is not allowed to be identified.
37 And in those broad outlines the law is pretty homogenous
around the world, as a result of the wide membership of the
principal international instruments in this area of law.
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claims draw their legitimacy from long-established dis-
tinct cultural and social normative imperatives. By anal-
ogy with land law prior to A/Iabo: land declared terra
nullius could be used freely, or appropriated if legal
conditions were met. For those who in fact had a claim
to land based on different cultural, social and political
norms, this amounted to a denial of rights, or an expro-
priation of land.
Similarly, knowledge declared in the public domain is
open to use without restraint or to appropriation in
accordance with certain conditions. For those who in
fact have a claim to that knowledge construed on the
basis of different normative structures, this amounts to
an expropriation of l~owledge. To coin a phrase, the
public domain is the scientia nullius38 of intellectual
property law; just as the now discredited theory of terra
nullius was really a theory justifying unwarranted dis-
possession of land, the theory of scientia nullius can be
conceived as a justification for the dispossession of
knowledge.
indigenous claims to knowledge
The claims of indigenous peoples to control knowledge
serve as an example. Such claims are justifiable and
legitimate, but only on the basis of social, cultural and
political precepts that are not or are only barely recog-
nised by the dominant norm. They are readily trumped
by the apparent justification that what is claimed lies in
the "public domain".39 This would not be so significant
were it not for the fact that the social and cultural norms
that underlie the control of knowledge in indigenous
communities are often diametrically opposed to the
dominant norm, as reflected in the rules of intellectual
property law (as outlined above).
In terms of copyright law, for instance, artistic
expression of traditional indigenous Australians is often
bound to social norms of possession that do not stress
the individuality or control of a single author. Sociality
or communality of control over the knowledge and its
38 Lewis & Short’s Oxford Latin Dictionary (1969) defines
....."scientia" as: a kanowing or being skilled in any thing, knowledge,
science, skill, expertness.
39 The more usual terms of the debate about indigenous rights
revolve around two diverging viewpoints: first, that indigenous
people should agitate for the inclusion of their claims over
knowledge within the framework of intellectual property law;
secondly, that since their claims are based in quite different
cultural notions, a sui generis system of protection for indigenous
lmowledge is more appropriate. The question then is how a sui
generis system can be compatible with the existing system of
IPRs, and with the dominant culture and social norms in post-
colonial societies. As to the position of indigenous peoples in
relation to intellectual property law, see M. Blakeney, "Protec-
tion of traditional medical knowledge of indigenous peoples"
[1997] E.I.RR. 298; Drahos, "Indigenous knowledge and the
Duties of Intellectual Property Owners" (1997) 11 I.P.J. 179; M.
Halewood, "Indigenous and Local Knowledge" [1999] McGill
L.J. 956; L. A. Whitt, "Indigenous peoples, intellectual property
and the new imperial science" (1998) 23 Oklahoma City Uni-
versity Law Review 211; C. Haight Farley, "Protecting folklore of
indigenous peoples: is intellectual property the answer?" (1997)
30 Connecticut Law Review 1; D. A. Posey, Traditional Resource
Rights (1996). See also J. Sutherland, "Representations of indig-
enous peoples’ knowledge and practice in modern international
law and politics" (1995) Austr.J. of Human Rights 39.
expression dominates.4° Control over knowledge and
expression is not dependent on material form or precise
delineation, but on rules that influence the conduct of
the artist as a member of a social group. Furthermore,
there is often a close and continuous relationship
between the act of creation and that of distribution, i.e.
between author and audience. In other words, perform-
ance is as much an act of creativity as is authorship
itself.
Both in terms of practical technology and artistic
expression, novelty or originality are not characteristics
that determine the value of knowledge in traditional
indigenous culture. Quite the contrary: valuable know-
ledge over which control is exercised is often of earlier
origin, orally transmitted, and only gradually evolving.
There is no need for a notion of sudden invention or
individual creation: value is proven by long experience.
Because there is no novelty requirement and control
over knowledge is exercised in the context of social
rather than commercial exchange, rights are not of lim-
ited duration. Religious connection to the possession
and control of knowledge is strong, barring the simple
commodification of such knowledge.
All these characteristics mean that indigenous know-
ledge often finds itself in the public domain. The public
domain notion then functions as a way of justifying the
denial of rights and rules relating to knowledge that
have legitimacy within the confines of indigenous
communities.
From this perspective the broad assertion that the
maintenance of a "healthy" public domain is in the
public interest, can be seen as an argument that favours
continued dispossession. The view that a bigger and
thus "healthier" public domain is ipso factq a "good
thing" across the board does not hold true.
40 The conflict between the norms that prevail in Australian
indigenous society and those represented by intellectual prop-
erty law has become apparent in a number of recent Australian
court decisions, where ingenious legal argument has been
deployed to overcome the limitations of IPRs from an aboriginal
perspective: see, e.g., John Bulu Bulun v. R. & T. Textiles Pry Ltd
(1998) 1082 EC.A. (September 3, 1998); Milpurrurru v. Indo-
furn Pry Ltd (1994) 54 RC.R. 240; (1994) 130 A.L.R. 659. The
recognition of native title rights to indigenous knowledge would
at once remove such knowledge from the public domain, but yon
Doussa J. in John Bulun Bulun v. R. & T. Textiles Pry Ltd, ibid.,
said the following about the matter: "These proceedings repre-
sent another step by Aboriginal people to have communal title in
their traditional ritual knowledge, and in particular in their art-
work, recognised and protected by the Australian legal system.
The inadequacies of statutory remedies under the Copyright Act
1968 as a means of protecting communal ownership have been
noted in earlier decisions of this Court: see Yumbulul v. Reserve
Bank of Australia (1991) 21 IPR 481 at 490 and Milpurrurru v.
Indofurn Pry Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 247. See also McKeough
and Stewart ’Intellectual Property and the Dreaming’, published
in Indigenous Australia and the Law, Johnston, Hinton & Rigney
eds. (1997); Henderson ’What’s in a Painting? The Cultural
Harm of Unauthorised Reproduction’ (1995) 17 Syd Law Rev
591 at 592; Ellison, ’Unauthorised Reproduction of Traditional
Aboriginal Art’ (1994) 17 UNSWALJ 327; and ’Stopping the
Rip-Offs: Intellectual Property Protection for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ (1994, National Capital Printing)
where it was said at p. 6: ’While joint authorship of a work by two
or more authors is recognised by the Copyright Act, collective
ownership by reference to any other criterion, for example,
membership of the author of a community whose customary
laws invest the community with ownership of any creation of its
members is not recognised.’ "
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What arguably does threaten the interests of indige-
nous peoples is not "excessive" appropriation by means
of the rules of intellectual property law, at least where
the traditional precepts are respected and appropriation
is correctly confined to new, inventive or creative know-
ledge.41 Rather, it is the rule that all knowledge that is
not appropriable by IPRs is in the public domain, avail-
able for unrestricted use by all, and justifiably so.
Conclusion
The public domain notion is commonly conceived of as
a bulwark against excessive private appropriation of
human knowledge. Maintenance of a "healthy" public
domain is then advanced as an important public policy
goal. The object of this article has been to re-examine
this thinking, and demonstrate that the notion of "pub-
lic domain" in intellectual property law can operate to
defeat arguably legitimate claims to control lranowledge.
This has been illustrated by reference to claims over
indigenous knowledge. However, the analytical path
advanced can be applied to any claims to knowledge
41 Recently, in The Grain Pool of I~A v. The Commonwealth
[2000] H.C.A. 14 (March 23, 2000) the High Court recognised
that novelty, together with intellectual effort, is an essential char-
acteristic of patents law for the purpose of determining the scope
of the intellectual property power in the Constitution (see paras
130-136). In the United States the constitutional power to "Pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries" (U.S. Const. Art I, para. 8,
cl. 8) is seen, by its use of the terms "Promote the progress..."
as limiting the powers of Congress to the granting of rights in
new, inventive or original subject-matter.
whose legitimacy does not derive from the dominant
norm.
The article started by calling the conceptual coher-
ence and utility of the notion of the public domain into
question. It then defined the subject-matter of intellec-
tual property as human knowledge. Often such know-
ledge does not meet the conditions required for
appropriation by operation of the rules of intellectual
property law. But those conditions are based on tempo-
rally and geographically bound cultural, social and eco-
nomic precepts, as is the concept of public domain.
Such precepts are foreign to social groups with differ-
ent norms determining use and control of knowledge,
such as some Australian indigenous communities. To
them the notion of the public domain can thus operate
to legitimise the denial of claims to control over know-
ledge, and thus as an instrument of dispossession.
Hence the coining of the phrase scientia nullius, analo-
gous to the discredited notion of terra nullius in land
law.
At the very least, the public domain notion must be
treated with circumspection. Arguably, the notion
should be rejected in favour of an approach to intellec-
tual property law based on a carefully elaborated tax-
onomy of knowledge, rather than on crude and ex-post
facto divisions such as that between proprietary and
public domain knowledge. This might enable us to
define more effectively which forms of knowledge
should be subject to proprietary control, and how such
control should be reflected in a diversified rule struc-
ture. Maybe this could be done with appropriate regard
to non-dominant norm structures, indigenous or
other.
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